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Overview

• Policy interest

• Empirical questions

• Empirical challenges and ways to address them
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Policy interest

• Strength of patent rights
• Interplay with post-grant review systems (e.g. PTAB in U.S.)
• Lots of litigation especially in information and communication

technology (ICT) industry
• Litigation due to so-called patent assertion entities (PAE) aka patent

trolls
• Patent litigation involving standard essential patents (SEPs)
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How should the system be designed?
• Allow patent owners to enforce a patent if infringement is detected
• Allow defendants to challenge patent’s validity
• But also:
• Discourage strategic behavior
• Deter plaintiffs from seeking ‘overly broad’ injunctions or ‘excessive’
damages
• Deter nuisance lawsuits
• Discourage defendants from driving up enforcement costs to deter
assertion or force settlements
• System should strike balance between allowing patent owners

to enforce their rights and to obtain appropriate remedies while
avoiding incentives for excessive litigation
• Is the litigation system achieving that objective?
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Empirical questions
• How much litigation is there?
• Can we test validity of assumptions made by different theoretical

models of litigation (Shavell, 1996; Gelbach, 2018; Helland et al.,
2018)?
• Design of litigation system – specific aspects:
• Bifurcation and sequential trials
• Fee shifting
• Forum shopping
• Evaluate effect of specific litigation activity: NPEs, SEPs
• Legal, institutional, legislative changes::
• Frequent changes in the law and its application especially in common
law jurisdictions (e.g. in U.S. Mayo v. Prometheus 2012, CLS Bank v.
Alice 2014)
• Institutional changes (e.g. reform of IPEC in UK including SCT,
introduction of opposition procedures in Japan and Korea in 2015 and
2017 respectively)
• Legislative changes (AIA in the U.S.)
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Empirical analysis
• Challenges for quantitative analysis of patent litigation:
(1) Complexity of patent litigation (see Lecture 1)
(2) Observability of information
• Some information unobservable (private information exchanged
between parties)
• Information in principle observable, but unavailable (e.g. terms of
private settlement)
• Information in principle observable, but missing at random or not (e.g.
only judgments published, pre-trial motions are not)

(3) Large heterogeneity among court cases (see Lecture 3)
(4) Any observable information is the outcome of non-random choice:
selection
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Selection
• Selection biggest problem in cause-effect analysis
• Observed data outcome of optimizing behavior by the parties:
(1) Selection into court filing
(2) Selection conditional on claim filing
(3) Selection into settlement/judgment
(4) Selection into appeal
• Why does it matter?
• How would you answer the following research question:

What was the impact of a specific legal/institutional change on
litigation behavior (claims filed, plaintiff win rate, etc.)?
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Reminder: Selection
• Define:

(
1
Di =
0

if i files claim
otherwise.

• 2 “potential” outcomes for individual i (only 1 outcome realized)
• Outcome if does not file claim: Y0i
• Outcome if files claim: Y1i
• Causal effect of filing claim:

κ = Y1i − Y0i

(1)

Y1i = Y0i + κ

(2)

• Rewrite:
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Reminder: Selection
• This means we can write:

Avgn [Y1i |Di = 1] = κ + Avgn [Y0i |Di = 1]

(3)

• Subtract Avgn [Y0i |Di = 0]:

{Avgn [Y1i |Di = 1] − Avgn [Y0i |Di = 0]} =
|
{z
}
Difference in group means

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxκ + {Avgn [Y0i |Di = 1] − Avgn [Y0i |Di = 0]}
{z
}
|
Selection Bias

• This means:

difference in group means = average causal effect + selection bias
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1: Selection into court filing

• Only complaints filed with a court are

observed
• Disputes resolved or dropped before

plaintiff files complaint unobservable
• Survey results for the U.S. suggest

70% of patent infringement claims
never reach a court (Lemely et al.,
2017)
• Unclear how to account for this type

of selection

Ganglmair, Helmers, Love

Empirical Analysis

11 September 2019

10 / 33

1: Selection into court filing: implication
• Assume some legal or institutional change
• Observable: increase in the number of cases litigated in court

Out
In court

In court

Before
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1: Selection into court filing: implication
• Assume some legal or institutional change
• Observable: increase in the number of cases litigated in court

In court
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2: Selection conditional on court filing

• Some cases dropped after claim filing

(claim form only document)
Start

• Defendant acknowledges service and

files response (counterclaim)

Sue

Don’t sue

• If case proceeds, parties interact and

make series of decisions (litigant
controlled motions that force
exchange of information)

end

T rial
Settle
end

Don’t settle
Judgment

• Amount of information available

depends on these decisions
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2: Selection conditional on court filing

• Court may dismiss the case
• Parties may settle at any point –

decision to settle depends on set of
factors

Start
Don’t sue

• If case settled, usually no information

revealed about terms of settlement
(e.g. potential payments, licensing
agreements etc.)

Sue

end

T rial
Settle
end

Don’t settle
Judgment

• Difficult which party prevailed in

settlement
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3: Selection into judgment – no settlement
• Theory showed that

settlement process acts as a
“filter” on filed cases

Start

• Empirically this means that

Don’t sue

small and non-random
subset of cases not settled
(although ultimately empirical
question)

end

T rial
Don’t settle

Settle

Judgment

end

?

• Decided cases are not

representative of all patent
disputes filed with court, even
less so of all patent disputes
that never reach a court
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3: Selection into judgment – no settlement

1

UK IPEC/PHC 2007-2013

1

UK IPEC/PHC 2007-2013

Trademark
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.9

Trademark

Design

Copyright

.6

Plaintiff win rate
.7
.8

Design
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Plaintiff win rate
.7
.8

Copyright

Patent
.5

.5

Patent
.5

.6

.7
.8
Settlement rate
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3: Selection into judgment – no settlement

• Important implication (Shavell,

1996; Gelbach, 2018):
• Any plaintiff’s win rate can be

observed among litigated cases
• Cannot infer anything about

underlying causes from observed win
rates
• Interpreting win rates requires theory
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4: Selection into appeal

Start
Don’t sue

Sue

end

• Cases decided on appeal even

T rial
Don’t settle

Settle

more highly selected subset of
patent cases and in no way
representative of patent
disputes more generally

Judgment

end

?

?

W in

Lose

Don’t appeal
end
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Selection

• How to address selection?
• In practice often simply ignored (“[W]e do not control for selection.

Rather, we ask, given any selection that occurs, is there any
remaining association between patent and patentee characteristics
and the outcomes?” (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004))
• Ways to address selection:
• Theory
• Diff-in-diff
• Regression discontinuity
• Instrumental variable
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Reminder: Differences-in-differences

• Differences-in-differences (diff-in-diff) method works when there is

selection
• Need ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups (e.g. one type of cases affected

by Supreme Court decision, another is not)
• But treatment and control groups can differ for many reasons
• Main assumption: treatment and control outcomes move in

parallel in the absence of treatment
• Effect obtained from divergence between treatment and control group

post-treatment
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Reminder: Differences-in-differences
• Diff-in-diff has 3 ingredients (assuming 1 treatment and 1 control

group):
Yit = α + βTi + γPt + δrDD (Ti × Pt ) + eit

(4)

(1) A dummy for the treatment Ti that varies across treatment and control
groups – inclusion of Td controls for fixed differences between the units
being compared
(2) A dummy for post-treatment periods Pt that varies over time –
inclusion of Pt controls for the fact that conditions change over time
for everyone, whether treated or not
(3) Interaction term Td × Pt – the coefficient on this term is the diff-in-diff
causal effect.
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Reminder: Regression discontinuity
• Often changes in legal system occur on a specific date or decisions

happen within fixed time periods (e.g. institutional/legal change
takes effect on specific date; institution decision at PTAB)

• This means that treatment is a deterministic function of time
• If change generates a discontinuity in the data, can use Regression

Discontinuity Design (RDD)
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Reminder: Regression discontinuity

• Define treatment as

(
1
Di =
0

if time t ≥ t∗
otherwise.

(5)

• Treatment status is a deterministic function of t
• Treatment status is a discontinuous function of t, no matter how close

t gets to cutoff t∗, Di remains unchanged until cutoff is reached
• Sharp v fuzzy RDD
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Regression discontinuity

.02

Probability of filing of parallel PTAB petition
.04
.06
.08
.1
.12

1-year limit

-100

Ganglmair, Helmers, Love

-50
0
50
100
Difference in days between filing of court case and 1-year limit

Empirical Analysis

11 September 2019

27 / 33

Instrumental Variable (IV): Judge Fixed Effects

• Individual judges affect outcomes
• Heterogeneity among judges
• Key institutional feature: random assignment of cases to judges

(exclusion restriction)
• Key idea: binary outcome of cases i 6= j valid IV for outcome of case

i if same judge in i and j
• Widely used in analysis of court decisions for a long time
• Application to patent litigation: Galasso and Schankerman (2015)
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Reminder: Instrumental Variable

• IV requires:
• IV has a causal effect in first-stage (direct effect of IV on

treatment)
• IV is unrelated to the omitted variables (independence assumption)
• Single channel through which the IV affects outcomes (exclusion

restriction)
• Instrument pushes treatment only in one direction (monotonicity)
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Reminder: Instrumental Variable

First stage:
Di = α1 + φZi + γ1 Xi + e1i

(6)

where Di is the endogenous variable, Zi is the IV
From the first stage we get:
D̂i = α1 + φZi + γ1 Xi

(7)

Second stage (which includes Xi ):
Yi = α2 + λSLS D̂i + γ2 Xi + e2i
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Judge Fixed Effects
• Example: impact of invalidity on forward citations

citesi = β0 + β1 invalidi + β2 Xi + i

(9)

where citesi forward cites for litigated patent i, invalidatedi equal to
one if patent i was invalidated, and Xi are patent characteristics
• OLS estimate of β1 biased if E(β1 i ) 6= 0
• Use IV: leave-one-out mean of case outcomes

Pnj −1
Zij =

k6=i

invalidk

(10)

nj − 1

• where nj is the total number of cases decided by judge j
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Summary

• Lots of interesting questions (testing theory, policy, etc.)
• Selection poses fundamental problems to any type of analysis of

patent litigation data
• Good idea to combine empirical analysis with theory
• But you can still use standard empirical tool set to address selection
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